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THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE FOR CORPORATE SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA IN NORTH SHORE GAS




In an effort to curb environmental pollution by holding
responsible parties financially liable for cleanup costs, the federal
government enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (hereinafter "CERCLA") in
1980.1 Numerous issues in the Act have spawned litigation since
its passage, but none, perhaps, as crucial as the determination of
exactly who should be held liable for CERCLA violations. De-
spite its comprehensive nature, CERCLA fails to expressly ad-
dress the liability of successor parent corporations for violations of
subsidiaries.2 It is this issue, which arose in North Shore Gas Co.
v. Salomon, Inc. (hereinafter "North Shore").3 In North Shore, the
Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to further define just how the
successor liability doctrine fits under the framework of CERCLA.
4
In accordance with the decisions passed down in other jurisdic-
tions, the court held that the doctrine of successor liability is ap-
plicable under CERCLA.5 However, the court failed to resolve the
issue of whether a federal common law test of liability or individ-
ual state corporate law should supply the basis for determining
when successor corporations will be held responsible for cleanup
costs. 6 This omission follows a split among the other circuits and
poses a significant threat to the effectiveness of CERCLA regula-
tions. 7
Staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW; J.D.
expected May 2002.
'Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1996).2See id.
'152 F.3d 642 (7"h Cir. 1998).
4See id. at 648.
51d. at 649 (citing B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996); United
States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4 Cir. 1992); United States v. Mexico Feed
& Seed Co., 980 F. 2d 478 (8"
h Cir. 1992); Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F. 2d
1240 (6' Cir. 1990); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (90, Cir. 1990)).
6See North Shore, 152 F.3d at 650-51.
'See id. at 650 (noting that the Sixth Circuit in Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
922 F. 2d 1240 (6" Cir. 1990) and the Ninth Circuit in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co.
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This Comment will examine the court's opinion in
North Shore, consider the effect of the decision within the context
of successor liability under CERCLA, and finally, contemplate
what course of action future courts may take as they determine the
law in this area. The Comment's objective is to illustrate how
North Shore's failure to decide the choice of law issue under
CERCLA continues a tradition of ambiguity in this area of the
law.
II. BACKGROUND
North Shore Gas Company initiated this action by seek-
ing a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois. The company wanted the court to
find it free from liability for the environmental cleanup costs asso-
ciated with a Colorado waste site.8 The defendant, Salomon In-
corporated (hereinafter "Salomon"), lost a motion to dismiss or
transfer the case, and the district court granted North Shore Gas
Company's motion for a declaratory judgment. 9 Salomon ap-
pealed the district court's decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals and the opinion, the subject of this Comment, was handed
down.1
0
The factual background of the case is not nearly as sim-
ple as the procedural background. In a fact pattern typical of cases
of this nature, a tangled web of closely related corporate entities
must be unraveled. Salomon's predecessor-in-interest purchased
the S.W. Shattuck Chemical Company (hereinafter "Shattuck") in
1969. "1 Both prior to and after the transaction, Shattuck operated
a mineral processing facility in Denver, Colorado.' 2 This is the
facility at which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
found the CERCLA violations that became the basis for the cur-
rent action. Salomon guaranteed the financial performance of
S.W. Shattuck, its wholly owned subsidiary, and at the time of the
appeal to the circuit court, cleanup costs had exceeded $20 million
v. Brown & Bryant, Inc. 132 F.3d 1295 (9" Cir. 1997) were the only circuit courts that relied on
state law to determine issues of successor liability.).
'North Shore, 152 F.3d at 645.
'Id.
'old.
"id. at 642.2North Shore, 152 F.3d at 642.
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dollars. 13
According to common practice in such situations, Shat-
tuck sought out other potentially responsible parties in an effort to
reduce its costs. 14 It found that from 1934 to 1942, North Shore
Coke & Chemical Company (hereinafter "North Shore Chemical")
owned 60% of Shattuck and had utilized the Denver site exten-
sively for the processing and disposal of hazardous waste products
created in mining operations.
1 5
The trail of control over North Shore Chemical presents
another series of complications. In 1927, William Baehr (herein-
after "Baehr") incorporated North Shore Chemical. He was also
the manager, and later the president, of the North Shore Gas Com-
pany (hereinafter "North Shore Gas").' 6 From 1927 to 1942, the
two corporate entities were very closely related, with North Conti-
nent Utilities Corporation, a holding company that Baehr formed
in 1922, holding a large portion of the stock in both companies.
17
In describing the relationship between North Shore Chemical and
North Shore Gas Company in 1940, a consultant stated: "the ac-
tual operations of the properties are interdependent .... Broadly
speaking, the two companies represent a single business enter-
prise." 8 This relationship is a key factor in determining the legal
responsibilities of the surviving corporate entity of the North
Shore conglomerate.
Ultimately, government regulation and disagreements
among the companies led to re-organization in 1941. North Shore
Chemical sold all of its assets to North Shore Gas Company, ex-
cept for stock in North Continent mine operations and in Shattuck,
both of which were transferred to North Continent Utilities.'
9
North Shore Chemical was subsequently liquidated in 1942, and
North Continent Utilities dissolved in 1954, leaving only North
Shore Gas Company for Shattuck to pursue as a potentially re-
sponsible party.
20
Shattuck's demands upon North Shore Gas led to this






"8North Shore, 152 F.3d at 646.
191d.
'Old. at 647.
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
North Shore Gas was not liable for cleanup costs associated with
the Denver site. In reviewing the district court's grant of North
Shore Gas's declaratory judgment motion, the Seventh Circuit
upheld the district court's denial of Salomon's motion to dismiss
or transfer the case on jurisdictional grounds.
2' The court then
addressed whether a successor corporation incurs the liability of
its subsidiary for the cost of cleanup under CERCLA.
22 The issue
was one of first impression for the Seventh Circuit. To properly
comprehend the issue of successor liability in North Shore, it is
first necessary to understand the development of successor liabil-
ity under CERCLA.
1I. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER
CERCLA
The opinion in North Shore notes that the plain language
of CERCLA imposes liability on "covered persons," with the stat-
ute defining a "person" as an "individual, firm, corporation, asso-
ciation, partnership, consortium, joint venture, [or] commercial
entity."23 Furthermore, Congress intended that certain rules of
construction apply to the United States Code. These rules include
references to a corporation, wherein the terms "company" or "as-
sociation" "shall be deemed to embrace the words 'successors and
assigns of such company or association."'
24 This broad interpreta-
tion of terms allowed for the development of the concept of suc-
cessor liability under CERCLA.
The court's opinion notes a rich history of case law deal-
ing extensively with successor liability, and despite CERCLA's
failure to expressly address the issue, circuit courts faced with the
question have unanimously found that Congress intended for suc-
cessor liability to apply under CERCLA.
25 The court in North
Shore followed this precedent and recognized the application of
successor liability under CERCLA.
26
The purpose of CERCLA similarly supports such an inter-
"id. at 648.
22Id. at 649.
2'1d. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(21), 9607(a)).24
North Shore, 152 F.3d at 649 (citing I U.S.C. § 5).
25See B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Caro-
lina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832 (4 Cir. 1992); United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co.,
980 F. 2d 478 (8" Cir. 1992); Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F. 2d 1240 (6"
h 
Cir.
1991); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260 (9
th Cir. 1990).26
North Shore, 152 F.3d at 650.
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pretation of the statute. Congress implemented CERCLA to effec-
tively assign liability to the parties responsible for the production
of hazardous waste. 7 The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Mex-
ico Feed and Seed Co., put it best when it noted that Congress was
unlikely to intend for a loophole to allow corporations to die "pa-
per deaths, only to rise phoenix-like from the ashes, transformed,
but free of their former liabilities., 28 Extending this logic into the
realm of successor liability, the court in North Shore points out
that successor corporations derive many benefits from their ac-
quired subsidiaries' previous environmental violations. 29 The
most obvious benefit is the monetary savings that result from more
cost-efficient methods of hazardous disposal.30
The most intriguing part of the opinion, and ultimately the
issue driving the analysis of this Comment, is the discussion of the
application of successor liability. As previously noted, the circuit
courts are unanimous in holding that the doctrine of successor
liability is applicable under CERCLA.3 1 The only unsettled issue
among these courts, and the issue on which this Comment focuses,
is whether federal common law or state corporate law should gov-
ern such an application.32 In North Shore, the court gives a
lengthy discussion of this issue, only to sidestep it by claiming
neither party contested the district court's application of federal
common law.
33
The application of the federal statute (CERCLA) does not
necessitate the promulgation of a federal rule.34 When a federal
statute fails to expressly address an issue, it is typically left to the
states to fashion a standard for determining the parameters of
regulation. 35 Indeed, in a large portion of corporate law, the
United States Code provides only general statutory guidance, leav-
ing the states to regulate through state statutes and state case law.
However, there are two distinct policy arguments that address the
creation of a federal common law.
271d. at 649.
2"980 F 2d. 478,487 (8 Cir. 1998).





34Jessica Demonte, The Impact Of United States v. Bestfoods On Parent Liability
Under CERCLA: When A Door Is Closed. Look For An Open Window, 61 OHIO ST. LJ. 443,
446 n.20 (2000).
3"See North Shore, 152 F.3d at 650.
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Proponents of a federal common law rule point out that a
federal statute, like CERCLA, should be uniformly applied.
36
They argue that without uniform application of the statute, the
goals of CERCLA will be frustrated. Allowing individual states to
fashion individual law governing the application of successor li-
ability could invite states to create law in a manner that allows
corporbLtions to avoid successor liability under CERCLA, which
would hinder the purpose of the federal statute.
37 Furthermore, in
applying state law standards, questions arise as to which state law
would be applicable.3 8 As North Shore illustrates, there are often
a number of complex corporate entities involved in these proceed-
ings. In a case such as North Shore, the law of the state of incor-
poration or the law of the pollution site could possibly offer dif-
ferent rules and very different results.
However, other circuit courts have concluded that state
law should provide the rule of decision for successor 
liability.39
This argument, at its most basic level, is founded in federalism.4
Proponents point out that since CERCLA is silent as to successor
liability, it is an issue properly left for the states to decide." State
law could be fashioned to favor corporations by allowing them to
escape liability as successors under CERCLA, or it could give
preference to environmental concerns and promulgate successor
liability standards that are tough on corporations.
42 Regardless,
many people argue that CERCLA's silence on the issue necessi-
tates deference to state law. 3
Furthermore, state corporate law on the issue of successor
liability is nearly uniform throughout the country.
44 The argument
is that this uniformity negates the need for the promulgation of a
federal common law standard. As Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion in Anspec Co., Inc. v. Johnson Controls, Inc. noted,
"without a showing that state law is inadequate to achieve the fed-
eral interest, 'we discern no imperative need to develop a general
3Demonte, supra note 34, at 476.37
1d.
391d.
"North Shore, 152 F.3d at 650. (citing Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.
2d 1240 (6"' Cir. 1990); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, 132 F. 3d
1295 (9" Cir. 1997)).




"Atchison, 132 F.3d at 1300-01; See also Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1249.
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body of federal common law to decide cases such as this."'
45
Thus, proponents of state law argue that judicial restraint dictates
reliance upon state law to determine the applicability of successor
liability under CERCLA.
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S TREATMENT OF THE CHOICE
OF LAW ISSUE IN NORTH SHORE GAS
In North Shore, the Seventh Circuit chose to sidestep the
choice of law issue. The relevant portion of the opinion notes
that:
Here the district court decided that federal
common law applied to the dispute between
Salomon and North Shore Gas. On appeal, both
parties have neglected to brief the issue and
seemingly assume that federal common law ap-
plies. Although we recognize that we have "the
independent power to identify and apply the
proper construction of governing law," [citing]
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S.
90, 99 (1991), we think it prudent to reserve the
choice-of-law question until we are confronted
with a case in which the parties have argued the
issue. [citing] United States v. Bestfoods, 524
U.S. - _... n. 9.46
The court recognizes the importance of the issue but relies
on the parties' failure to raise the issue to avoid making a deci-
sion.4 7 While it is possible that the question was not ripe, the
court's failure to rule on the issue serves to further cloud an al-
ready hazy area of the law.
Yet, the court did utilize language in the opinion that indi-
cates how they might decide the issue should it be properly pre-
sented.48 The court noted that the Supreme Court established the
proper test for determining whether Congress intended the judici-
ary to fashion federal common law in United States v. Kimbell
45
Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1249.
"North Shore, 152 F.3d at 650.
4
7
See id. at 650-51.
"See id. at 650.
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Foods.49 In Kimbell Foods, the Court set forth three factors that
should be considered when deciding whether federal common law
would be appropriate. The three factors include: "(1) whether the
issue requires a "nationally uniform body of law"; (2) "whether
application of state law would frustrate the specific objectives of
the federal programs"; and (3) whether "application of a federal
rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state
law.",50
While noting these standards, the Seventh Circuit did not
apply them to the concept of successor liability under CERCLA,
instead choosing to reserve the question for when it is properly
before the court.5 Since the district court decided to follow fed-
eral common law and no issue'was made of it on appeal, the Sev-
enth Circuit reasoned that it should also use federal common 
law.5 2
This reluctance to follow state corporate law would seem to indi-
cate that the Seventh Circuit favors a uniform federal common law
approach to successor liability under CERCLA.
After determining that it was appropriate to apply a federal
common law standard in North Shore, the court focused on the
issue of whether North Shore Gas inherited the liabilities of the
North Shore Chemical Company. 3 To make this determination,
the Seventh Circuit had to fit North Shore Gas into one of the four
established exceptions to the general rule that an asset purchaser
does not acquire the liabilities of the seller.5 4 The four exceptions
are: (1) the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the
liabilities; (2) the transaction is a de facto merger or consolidation;
(3) the purchaser is a "mere continuation" of the seller; and (4) the
transaction is an effort to fraudulently escape liability.55
The first thing the court noted in its analysis was that an
asset purchase can be described more accurately as a reorganiza-
tion.56 A theme within the exceptions allowing successor liability
is that the seller "survives the sale."57 This factor cuts in favor of
holding North Shore Gas liable for the cleanup of the Shattuck site
49440 U.S. 715 (1979).






55Id.; see also e.g., Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 519; Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838;
Vernon v. Schuster, 688 N.E. 2d 1172, 1175-76 (1997).
56
North Shore, 152 F.3d at 651.
"See id.
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because a reorganization suggests, in some respects, that the seller
survives the sale. 58 Furthermore, the court found that the reor-
ganization did not essentially alter the identity of the company.5 9
The close relationship between the corporate entities bolsters this
finding. Despite complicated corporate maneuverings, North
Shore Gas must be considered the surviving entity of the North
Shore conglomerate.
The court then took each exception in turn and attempted
to apply it to the facts of North Shore. First, North Shore Gas
Company cannot be said to have explicitly assumed the liabilities
of the Chemical Company. 60 Illinois contract law required the
court to give effect to the parties' intent at the time the agreement
was made.61 Noting that the language of the reorganization allows
for the assumption of all "existing" liabilities, the court concluded
that the CERCLA violations could not be said to be in existence at
the time of the transaction.6 2
The second determination involves analyzing the transac-
tion as a de facto merger or consolidation. The court recognized
two factors that drive this analysis. 63 The first was a continuation
of enterprise with regards to such characteristics as management,
personnel, and physical location. 64 The second involved the cor-
poration assuming the obligations of the seller necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of the business.6 5 While noting that the
de facto merger exception involved a complicated analysis, the
court chose to focus on the continuation of the enterprise factor
and found it applicable to the facts of North Shore.66 The court
relied on a hybrid analysis that combines aspects of the merger
doctrine with the basis for the third, "mere continuation" excep-
tion to find successor liability exists for the North Shore Gas
Company.
67
The application of this hybrid test to the facts is not so
clear. The court seems to rely upon principles of equity to estab-
lish that the North Shore Gas Company "continued" the enterprise




62See North Shore, 152 F.3d at 652.
6'Id.
"Id. at 652-53 (citing Louisiana Pacific, 909 F.2d 1264).
'North Shore, 152 F.3d at 652-53 (citing Louisiana Pacific, 909 F.2d 1264).
6North Shore. 152 F.3d at 653.
67See id. at 654.
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carried on by the North Shore Chemical Company at the Shattuck
site.68 In a footnote, the court recognized that this comes close to
a fifth, "substantial continuity" exception to the doctrine of suc-
cessor liability that is not widely accepted.
69 The court noted that
"the mere continuation exception allows recovery when the pur-
chasing corporation is substantially the same as the selling corpo-
ration." 70 However, relying upon the close relationship among the
operation of the companies previously noted, the court found the
exception applicable in this case. In finding the exception appli-
cable, the court neglected to continue with an analysis of the other
exceptions.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CHOICE OF LAW ISSUE
By utilizing a federal common law standard to find North
Shore Gas liable for CERCLA cleanup costs, the Seventh Circuit
creates an incomplete precedent for future successor liability
cases. The court failed to articulate a complete position on the
issue by refusing to decide if state corporation law or federal
common law should provide the parameters for the application of
the successor liability doctrine. The court's ruling does not take a
stance on an issue that has divided the federal circuits. The United
States Supreme Court, in United States v. Bestfoods (hereinafter
"Bestfoods ") provides a telling reason why the court chose this
route. 71
In Bestfoods, the parties presented the Supreme Court with
the opportunity to decide the choice of law question." At issue in
the case was the applicability of a state or federal corporate veil-
piercing standard to determine parent corporation liability under
CERCLA.7 3 In establishing the logic the Seventh Circuit followed
in North Shore, the Supreme Court stated that the issue was not
adequately contemplated by the litigants, and thus, not ripe for
adjudication. 4 However, there are indications in Bestfoods that




Od. at 654 (citing FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §7124.10 (perm. ed. 1990)).
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liability question for state common law.7"
One indicator is the Supreme Court's deferral to the Sixth
Circuit's application of state veil-piercing standards, since the
issue was not challenged on appeal. 6 It is interesting to note that
the North Shore court cited this deferral in also choosing to defer
to a lower court's decision. However, in deferring, the Seventh
Circuit was applying a federal rather than state law standard."
Perhaps the more persuasive indicator of the Supreme Court's po-
sition on the issue is Justice Souter's language in the majority
opinion noting that, "the entire corpus of state corporation law is
[not] to be replaced simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is
based upon a federal statute.,7 8  This language indicates the
Court's preference for leaving the issue to state common law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's opinion in North Shore was this ju-
risdiction's first treatment of an issue that has split the circuits. In
finding that the doctrine of successor liability is applicable under
the federal CERCLA statute, the court followed the unanimous
lead of other circuits. However, the court failed to articulate a
complete position on the issue by refusing to decide if state corpo-
rate law or federal common law should provide the parameters for
the application of the successor liability doctrine. Ultimately, this
failure diminishes the effectiveness of the case as an established
precedent that corporate entities can rely upon in fashioning their
conduct with respect to the CERCLA guidelines. The case also
creates uncertainty for the Environmental Protection Agency as it
attempts to enforce CERCLA while unsure of which body of law
is proper. Furthermore, the case seems to contradict the intent of
the Supreme Court as expressed in dicta in the Bestfoods opinion.
The sidestepping of the choice of law issue was probably a sound
decision based on judicial restraint. In the future, however, the
court should follow the lead of the Supreme Court by showing
similar restraint in fashioning federal common law for an issue
properly left to the individual states.
"5See Demonte, supra note 34, at 480.
'6See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63.
"See North Shore, 152 F.3d at n.8.
71Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 63 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,478 (1979)).

